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Abstract  
This study investigated the mechanisms behind episodic autobiographical memory 
(EAM) development in school-age children. Thirty children (6 to 11years) performed a novel 
EAM test. We computed one index of episodicity via autonoetic consciousness and two 
indices of retrieval spontaneity (overall and EAM-specific) for a recent period (previous 
school year) and a more remote one (preschool years). Executive functions, and episodic and 
personal semantic memory were assessed. Results showed that recent autobiographical 
memories (AMs) were mainly episodic, unlike remote ones. An age-related increase in the 
indices of episodicity and specific spontaneity for recent AMs was mainly mediated by an 
age-related increase in the efficiency of the three cognitive abilities. Remote AMs varied only 
slightly with age (overall spontaneity), reflecting improvements in semantic abilities. Thus, 
EAM development in school-age children is essentially bound up with the increasing 
efficiency of cognitive abilities. Results are discussed in the light of models of childhood 
amnesia. 
 
Keywords: autobiographical memory, episodic memory, executive function, semantic 
memory, autonoetic consciousness, Remember/Know, emotion, visual imagery, childhood 
amnesia, children. 
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Introduction 
Autobiographical memory (AM) is now recognized as being multifaceted, containing 
a corpus of general knowledge, as well as unique experiences specific to an individual, which 
have been accumulated since childhood and allow the latter to construct a feeling of identity 
and continuity (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & 
Moscovitch, 1988). According to current conceptions of episodic memory (Tulving, 2001, 
2002), episodic AM (EAM) refers not only to personal events recollected in the context of a 
particular time and place, but also to the phenomenological experience of remembering (see 
Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009, for a review). Tulving’s conception of episodic 
memory is inextricably bound up with subjectively-sensed time and the subjective 
phenomenological recollective experience. As such, it encompasses perceptual, affective and 
spatiotemporal contextual details, and autonoetic consciousness, which is defined as a sense 
of self in time and the mental reliving of subjective experiences arising from the encoding 
context (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Hence, EAM makes it possible to travel mentally 
through subjective time, from present to past, and thus to recollect, one’s own previous 
experiences via autonoetic consciousness. Therefore, not all memories that are 
autobiographical have an autonoetic character mediated by the episodic memory system. For 
instance, the semantic component of AM is characterized by the retrieval of general facts and 
events pertaining to oneself through “just knowing” instead of remembering. Tulving’s theory 
(Tulving, 1985, 2001, 2002; Wheeler, 1999) suggests that EAM develops later in ontogeny 
than semantic AM. 
Although extensive research on the early development of AM indicates that 
preschoolers are quite adept at recounting the past (Bauer, 1996; Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, & 
Cerrito, 2004; Meltzoff, 1995; Nelson, 1988), their narratives certainly do not meet the strict 
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definition of EAM. Young children’s narratives are mainly about scripted events (Nelson, 
1986), and before 4 or 5 years, children have difficulty answering questions about the context 
and causal sequence of unique personal events (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Hudson, 1990; 
Pillemer, Picariello, & Pruett, 1994; Uehara, 2000; Van Abbema & Bauer, 2005). Older 
children, on the other hand, can recount specific and unique aspects of their experiences. 
Nevertheless, the scant literature on AM in school-age children reveals that even 7- to 10-
year-old children do not necessarily meet all EAM criteria: in particular, they often fail to 
mention the people who were present and the spatiotemporal context (Bauer, Burch, Scholin, 
& Güler 2007). Crucially, the autonoetic consciousness (i.e. sense of reliving the encoding 
context) associated with the recall of unique events situated in time and place with details 
continues to develop throughout childhood and into adolescence (Piolino, Hisland, 
Ruffeveille, Matuszewski, Jambaqué, & Eustache, 2007). Overall, these findings support 
Tulving’s view that mental travel through subjective time, which allows us to re-experience 
the past through self-awareness, is one of the last features of AM to become fully operational. 
Piolino, Hisland et al. (2007) have found that increasing age is a major contributing 
factor not only to specificity (of events and of details) and to autonoetic consciousness, but 
also to spontaneity of recall. Some of the few studies to have investigated this effect so far 
have reported that older children recall a great deal of information and details in response to 
open-ended questions, whereas younger children needed more prompts, suggesting that age 
differences in recall could be partially due to retrieval difficulties by young children.  
Retrieval difficulties have also been suggested as a potential explanation for the 
phenomenon of childhood amnesia (see de Haan, Mishkin, Baldeweg & Vargha-Khadem, 
2006; Piolino & Eustache, 2001, for reviews). This phenomenon concerns the small number 
of memories that are encoded before the age of 5 years, with a practically total absence of 
memories before the age of 3 (Newcombe, Lloyd, & Ratliff, 2007). Whereas many studies 
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have investigated adult recall of memories encoded during the first five years of life (Rubin, 
2000), very few have been carried with school-age children. Whatever the age of the children 
at recall (6 to 19 years old), Peterson, Grant and Boland (2005) reported that the largest 
proportion of memories recalled from this period concerned snapshots of a particular moment 
in time, rather than contextually rich episodes. Moreover, Van Abbema and Bauer (2005) 
showed that 7- to 9-year-old children only recalled half the events that had been encoded 
during the period of childhood amnesia (i.e. when children were 3 of age) and that these 
recollections included only half as many details as memories of recent events. However, these 
studies did not explore the essential character of EAM, i.e. autonoetic consciousness. 
In short, all these studies suggest that EAM undergoes developmental changes 
between early childhood and adolescence. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to interpret the 
effect of age on EAM because, in most cases, recollection involves a controlled retrieval 
process that relies on executive functions (see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 
2005; Piolino, Desgranges, Manning, North, & Eustache, 2007). This process, which 
comprises elaborative, strategic and evaluative processes, provides access to event-specific 
episodic knowledge (e.g. spatiotemporal and sensory-perceptual details) from a semantic 
knowledge base (e.g. lifetime periods and generic events). Thus, problems in accessing and 
recalling specific events and episodic details, may stem not only from episodic memory 
difficulties per se, but also from difficulties related to the controlled retrieval process (i.e., 
executive functions). Executive function ability (Huizinga & van der Molen, 2006; Lehto, 
Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003) is thought to emerge gradually throughout adolescence 
and into early adulthood, in parallel with the maturation of the prefrontal cortex (Casey, 
Galvan, & Hare, 2005; Giedd, Blumenthal, Jeffries, Castellanos, Liu, Zijdenbos et al., 1999; 
Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 1999; Sowell, Thompson, Tessner, & Toga, 
2001). Studies are needed to test this executive/frontal hypothesis within the framework of 
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EAM development. Moreover, in addition to executive functions, differences in semantic 
memory may also contribute to developmental changes in EAM. More specifically, higher-
level personal semantic knowledge (e.g. knowledge about “being a schoolgirl at La Bruyère 
primary school in Paris”) is known to govern access to lower-level, event-specific sensory-
perceptual episodic information (e.g. “my first day at school”; Barsalou, 1988; Conway, 2001, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Although Nelson and Fivush (2004) have suggested 
that episodic and semantic memory abilities may be the most influential factors in AM 
development, no study has thoroughly tested the involvement of these memory systems in 
EAM development. 
Beyond the possible involvement of cognitive abilities in EAM development (see 
Gathercole, 1998), few studies have looked at whether the processes subtending the retention 
and recall of EAMs may also be determined by other factors, such as memory rehearsal 
(Cheatham & Bauer, 2005; Principe, Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Gordon, 2000; Usher & 
Neisser, 1993; but see Ornstein, Baker-Ward, Gordon, Pelphrey, Tyler, & Gramzow 2006), 
emotional value (Fivush, Sales, Goldberg, Bahrick, & Parker, 2004; Peterson & Bell, 1996; 
Ornstein, 1995) and visual mental imagery (Pillemer & White, 1989). In adults, visual mental 
imagery and emotional experience are regarded as critical phenomenological characteristics 
of EAM retrieval (Conway, 2005). Moreover, the repetition of memories (thinking or talking 
about a particular event) has been shown to influence autobiographical recollection either by 
reinforcing the persistence of phenomenological details over time (Rubin & Kozin, 1984) or 
by causing a shift from specific to general experiences (Cermak, 1984). . 
 
The purpose of the present study was therefore to explore the development of EAM in 
school-age children according to the encoding period: recent memories (previous school year) 
versus remote memories encoded during the period of childhood amnesia (first five years of 
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life). Our objective was not so much to study the effect of remoteness, as to compare 
memories from the period of childhood amnesia with other more recent memories that were 
relatively comparable in terms of retention mechanisms, i.e. based on self-relevance 
(contrasting with very recent memories based on mundane daily experiences that often vanish 
within a few days or weeks; Conway, 2001, 2005). We wanted first to shed light on the effect 
of age on EAM across these two periods, then to study the developmental retrieval 
mechanisms underpinning EAM improvement in school-age children. We tackled this issue 
by using a previously validated AM test adapted for children (Piolino, Hisland et al., 2007). 
This test allows episodic memories to be strictly assessed, using the Remember/Know 
procedure (Tulving, 1985) to disentangle the remembering of specific and detailed events 
(autonoetic consciousness) from the “just knowing”. We also added measurements of critical 
attributes of EAM, such as frequency of rehearsal, emotion and visual mental imagery. 
Furthermore, the contribution of three potential cognitive mechanisms thought to facilitate 
encoding and access to EAM (see above) was tested: executive functions, episodic memory and 
personal semantic memory. In this way, we expected to be able to ascertain whether an age-
related increase in EAM ability exists above and beyond the indirect effect of age on other 
cognitive skills. In accordance with previous studies (Piolino, Hisland et al., 2007; Van 
Abbema & Bauer, 2005), we assumed that there would be an age-related increase in EAM for 
the recent period, but not for the remote period of childhood amnesia. We also expected 
developmental differences in accessing highly specific autonoetic memories to be attributable 
to developmental differences not just in frontal/executive functions (Piolino, Hisland, et al., 
2007) but also in episodic and semantic memory (Conway, 2005; Nelson & Fivush, 2004; 
Tulving, 2005). 
 
Methods 
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Subjects 
Thirty healthy schoolchildren, 15 girls and 15 boys aged between 6 years 6 months 
and 11 years 3 months (M = 8 years 9 months, S.D. = 1 year 7 months), were recruited from 
elementary schools in Lower Normandy, France, to take part in the study. Subjects primarily 
came from middle- and upper middle-class families, and were mainly Caucasian. None of the 
subjects had any neurological or psychiatric medical history. They were all in mainstream 
schooling and none of them had repeated a year. We checked that all the subjects had so far 
had a normal childhood and had not suffered any traumatic events. All children could read 
and had normal intellectual abilities, as indicated by their score on the Similarities subtest of 
the WISC-III (i.e. minimum scores of 10, M = 12.57, S.D. = 2.01; Wechsler, 1991). Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants, as well as from their parents.  
Each child was tested individually in a quiet area of the school in two sessions, each 
lasting approximately one hour. In the first session, participants performed the WISC-III 
Similarities subtest (Wechsler, 1991), followed by the AM test. In the second session, subjects 
underwent an extensive additional battery of cognitive tests designed to assess episodic 
memory, executive functions and personal semantic memory. Tests were administered in a 
fixed sequence.  
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY TEST: THE TEMPAU TASK  
 A semi-structured autobiographical questionnaire was based on a new EAM paradigm 
validated in school-age children (Piolino, Hisland et al., 2007), called the TEMPAu task (Test 
Episoque de Mémoire du Passé Autobiographique). This assesses the sense of re-experiencing 
events from different periods using the Remember/Know procedure. This procedure makes it 
possible to differentiate between autonoetic and noetic consciousness (Gardiner, 1988, 2001; 
Tulving, 1985), i.e. between episodic and semantic memory retrieval (see Piolino, Hisland et 
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al., 2007, for further details). For the purposes of the present study of EAM, the task explored 
the recent personal past (i.e. the previous school year) versus the remote personal past (i.e. the 
first 5 years, or preschool years). The periods were introduced in random order, either the 
most remote followed by the most recent or vice-versa. General instructions were provided, as 
well as practice tests at the beginning of the procedure, to make the nature of the recall tasks 
clear. The time allowed for recall was unrestricted, but generally lasted one hour.  
 The children, individually tested, were asked to remember specific, personally 
experienced events prompted by 3 general topics for each time period: a school or 
kindergarten event, a trip or vacation event and a family event. The general instructions stated 
that, regardless of the time period, memories had to concern unique personal events which 
lasted less than a day - “a short moment” situated in time and space -, and which they could 
mentally relive with details, e.g. “Give details of a particular event, which took place in your 
family life”. The subjects were always asked to give as many details as possible, so that we 
could be sure that no details had been left untold. Where necessary, if the children had 
difficulty carrying out the task, they were given further cues (e.g. “A day with a teacher or a 
school friend”) and/or encouraged to be more specific (“Does this remind you of a particular 
day?”, “Did this only happen once?”). After 3 cues and/or encouragements, the tester 
switched to another topic.  
 After recalling each event, the children had to indicate whether or not they could 
consciously recollect its prior occurrence, by making separate Remember/Know judgments 
for the content, place and date of the event (What, Where and When, respectively). They 
could also say whether they had simply guessed the event (Mäntylä, 1993). It is important to 
note that the judgment categories (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, Cohen, 1997; 
Gardiner, 2001) were explained very carefully to each child until each concept used in this 
test was thoroughly understood and that a visual reminder was placed in front of the children 
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during the task. First of all, the children were instructed to select one of these categories (i.e. 
Remember, Know or Guess) with reference to the factual content (What) of the event they 
had recalled, and then with reference to the place and date of that event. For example, they 
might give a Remember response concerning a particularly enjoyable birthday party (i.e. 
“What” R response) that had taken place in a particular environment (i.e. “Where” R 
response) 2 months previously (i.e. “When” R response). Given that separate responses were 
given for each of the three contents (What, Where, When), the children might also, for 
example, give a Remember response for the factual and spatial content, but a Know response 
for the temporal content. Lastly, a procedure was performed to check whether the children 
had correctly recalled a specific event (i.e. unique, situated in time and space) and could 
justify each of their R judgments. Accordingly, for each R response they had provided, 
whether it was for What, Where or When, they had to supply additional contextual details 
about the original specific event, if they had not already provided them in full during the 
memory recall task. For example, the child might mentally relive the specific atmosphere and 
his/her thoughts and feelings (justified “What” R response), as well as recollecting highly 
specific visual details about the scene, his/her location in the scene (justified “Where” R 
response), and the thoughts he/she had about the time of the day and about the fact that the 
party was taking place exactly 2 days after his/her own birthday (justified “When” R 
response). 
Moreover, in order to determine the nature of the memory retrieval process, we 
recorded children’s self-assessments about features that are crucially involved in EAM (see 
Introduction). Accordingly, after recalling each memory and performing the R/K/G 
procedure, the children were asked to rate their memories on analogue scales (15-cm lines; 
subjective measurement, Aubrun, 1998) in terms of frequency of rehearsal (0 = never to 15 = 
very frequent), emotion (0 = no emotion to 15 = very strong emotion), and visual mental 
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imagery (0 = no images to 15 = very numerous images; instructions for the analogue scales 
are given in Appendix A).  
Scoring 
As the aim of our study was to investigate strictly episodic AM, based on its current 
definition, we focused the present study on three different scores recorded for each time 
period: two indices of spontaneity and one index of episodicity. Scores were calculated 
separately for each period.  
The two indices of spontaneity represented the ease with which subjects accessed 
AMs. They were based on the number of cues and/or encouragements to be specific that the 
subject required for each recollection using a four-point scale (max: 12, i.e. 4 points per topic 
and 3 topics per period). For example, the spontaneous retrieval of a specific event was given 
a score of 4 points, whereas retrieval achieved after three cues and/or encouragements was 
given a score of 1. Absence of recall despite cues and/or encouragements was scored zero. 
Conversely, the overall spontaneity index was based on the total number of cues and/or 
encouragements given by the experimenter. For each period, the maximum score was 12 (4 
points per topic and 3 topics per period. The score was converted into a percentage of the 
maximum score per period. By contrast, the specific spontaneity index only concerned the 
topics that allow children to access a memory. Consequently, it was calculated by dividing the 
number of cues and/or encouragements given by the experimenter by the maximum score for 
the number of events evoked. 
In the same vein, the index of episodicity took into account the number of memories 
evoked. It corresponded to the total number of R responses provided, whatever the type of 
information (What, Where or When), justified in terms of single events situated in time and 
place with retrieval of actual episodic details, divided by the maximum number of responses 
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possible according to the number of events recalled. For each period, the maximum score was 
9 (i.e. 3 justified R responses per topic and 3 topics per period). 
While scores of frequency of rehearsal, emotional intensity and visual mental 
imagery reflected the quality of the memories recalled, they were also dependent upon the 
number of memories evoked. The scores on the analogue scales were calculated by adding 
together the scores recorded for each personal event recalled (maximum score of 45, i.e. 3 
memories given the maximum rating of 15). In order to allow comparisons to be made 
between indices and scales, they were all converted into a percentage of the maximum score 
per period.  
 
All memories were scored according to the information supplied in the test and 
checked with the participants’ parents over the phone. The vast majority of recalled events 
was confirmed (see also Peterson et al., 2005; Piolino, Hisland et al., 2007); the few 
inconsistencies concerned the date of remote events for the younger children. 
 
COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT  
 Practice trials were administered prior to each task in order to ensure that the children 
understood the instructions. They were repeated if necessary.  
Executive functions 
 Three elementary executive functions identified by Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, Howerter, and Wager (2000) in adults and seemingly crucial to children, too (see 
Letho et al., 2003), were assessed.  
Shifting abilities were measured using a children’s version of the Trail making test 
(Reitan, 1958). In the first part of the test, children were asked to connect a set of numbers in 
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ascending order (1 to 13) randomly positioned on a sheet of paper. Part 2 resembled Part 1 
except that the participants were asked to connect a set of 13 letters in alphabetical order (A to 
M) instead of numbers. Finally, Part 3 featured a combination of digits (from 1 to 7) and 
letters (from A to E). Children had to link up digits in ascending order and letters in 
alphabetical order whilst alternating between digit and letter (e.g. 1–A–2–B–3–C, etc.). 
Completion times for each part (Parts 1, 2 and 3) were recorded and a formula applied to yield 
a flexibility score: Part 3-((Part 1+ Part 2)/2). 
A running span test (adapted from Morris & Jones, 1990) was used as the updating 
measure. Lists of consonants were read aloud by the tester at the rate of one per second. 
Participants were instructed to recall the last three letters they had heard in the right order. 
However, they were also told that they would not know in advance how many consonants 
would be in the list. Some lists were only three items long, so they could not afford to ignore 
any letters. There were 12 lists, 3 in each length (3, 5, 7 or 9 items). The 12 lists were 
randomly ordered, and this order was kept constant across participants. The dependent 
measure was the number of lists for which the subject correctly recalled the consonants.  
  The Stroop interference test (Stroop, 1935) was used to provide a measure of cognitive 
inhibition. This test was made up of four tasks. During each of them, subjects had 45 seconds 
to process a maximum number of stimuli. The first task consisted in reading aloud the names 
of colors printed in black (BLUE, GREEN, RED, YELLOW). In the second task, children had 
to read the names of colors printed in conflicting ink colors (e.g. BLUE printed in red ink). 
The third task required participants to name the color of colored rectangles, whereas the 
fourth one once more involved the processing of color names printed in conflicting ink colors. 
This time, however, they were asked to inhibit the most automatic process and carry out the 
least automatic one (naming the color of the ink rather than the word). Inhibition abilities 
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corresponded to the number of trials successfully performed in Task 4 subtracted from the 
number of correct trials in Task 3. 
 A composite executive function score was calculated for each subject. As the scores 
on the three executive function tests (shifting, updating and inhibition) were based on 
different scales, Z scores were used. The participants’ performances on each of the three tests 
were converted into Z scores, and these three Z scores were then averaged to obtain a 
composite measure representing the participant’s general executive ability.  
 
Episodic memory 
The Stories subtest of the Children’s Memory Scale (Cohen, 2001) was used to assess 
verbal episodic memory. Two short stories, which depended on the age of the children, were 
read slowly by the tester. After each story, subjects had to recall as much of it as they could. 
Thirty minutes later, delayed recall was performed; one point was allocated for each item of 
information that was correctly recalled (i.e. person, action, details, location, or temporal 
context). 
The Family Pictures subtest (CMS, Cohen, 2001) assessed visual episodic memory. 
Four pictures depicting scenes with different characters were shown to the children, who had 
to memorize as many components as possible (what, who and where). A delayed recall score 
(30 minutes later) was calculated by allocating one point to each person or location that was 
correctly recalled and 2 points to each action.  
An overall measure of episodic memory, reflecting overall episodic learning abilities, 
was calculated by converting each of the delayed recall scores to Z scores and averaging them 
to yield a composite episodic measure. 
 
Personal semantic memory 
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The recall of personal semantic information was measured by means of a test derived 
from Piolino, Hisland et al. (2007). This investigated the same two periods as the TEMPAu 
task (previous school year and preschool years) using 3 topics: 3 names of acquaintances 
together with their status (e.g. friends, neighbors), 3 personally relevant famous names 
together with their status (e.g. heroes, movie stars) and 4 items of information about school 
life (e.g. school’s name and address, a lesson or poem, characteristics of the classroom, i.e. 
floor and location of child’s desk). A point was given for each piece of information that was 
accurately recalled (i.e. confirmed by the mother) and half a point was given if the 
information was incomplete (e.g. a person’s name without his or her status; the school’s name 
but not its address). The number of points was added up for each period (maximum = 10) and 
converted into a Z score.  
The overall measure of personal semantic memory corresponded to the average of the 
Z score individually calculated for each lifetime period. 
 
RESULTS  
Statistical analyses 
As the treatment of age as a continuous variable serves as a more sensitive measure of 
developmental trends than the use of age as a grouping variable, exact age was used in all 
subsequent statistical analyses.  
Each analysis was conducted separately for each lifetime period to examine whether 
the effect of age on EAM and its underlying mechanisms differed according to the encoding 
period (recent period versus remote period). 
As preliminary analyses failed to reveal any gender differences either for EAM 
performances or for other cognitive performances, the data were collapsed across gender for 
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all subsequent analyses.  
 
Do AMs vary according to encoding period?  
Descriptive statistics of the children’s scores on the autobiographical test are provided 
in Table 1. The t-test for paired samples revealed that remote recollections were less 
numerous and less episodic than recent ones and required more cues overall (overall 
spontaneity; see Table 1; p < .01 to p < 10
-5
). By contrast, the specific spontaneity index did 
not vary according to the encoding period, suggesting that the numerous cues given in an 
attempt to access the childhood amnesia period had no impact on recall. Moreover, whatever 
the encoding period, memories were rarely rehearsed or highly emotional, and only rarely 
associated with visual mental imagery. Only the latter differed according to the encoding 
period, with remote memories being associated with less mental imagery (p < .01). Finally, 
children rarely associated their memories with Guess responses, whatever the period (10.48% 
and 14.81 % for the recent and remote periods, respectively – data not shown). Whereas only 
a quarter of recent memories were judged to be familiar (Know response; 25.81%), almost 
half the childhood amnesia memories were judged to be so (40.12%).  
Complementary analyses revealed that the topics provided by the experimenter affected 
the nature of the memories recalled, for although the same number of memories were recalled 
whatever the topic (2 = .17, 2 = 2.33, df = 2, ns for the remote and recent periods 
respectively), the recall of specific, unique and detailed events (EAMs) varied according to the 
topic for the remote period. Thus, whereas the number of recent EAMs recalled did not vary 
with the topic (2 = 0.27, df = 2, ns), remote EAMs predominantly concerned kindergarten 
events (2 = 6.2, df  = 2 p <.05). Similar numbers of preschool and school EAMs were produced 
for the recent and remote periods (2 = 088, df = 1, ns), while family and vacation EAMs were 
less numerous for the remote period (2 = 4.45 and 2 = 6.4, df = 1, p < .05, respectively).  
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In sum, the encoding period had a considerable impact on the ability of 6- to 11-year-
old children to recall events. Compared with recent memories, events encoded during the first 
five years of life were less numerous, less episodic and associated with less mental imagery, 
while specific memories more rarely concerned family and vacation events.  
 
Does EAM develop with age? 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between chronological age and 
the three indices recorded using the TEMPAu test revealed a large effect of age for the recent 
period, contrasting with smaller developmental differences for the remote period (see Table 
2.). More specifically, the specific spontaneity and episodicity indices showed a large age 
effect (r = .55, p < .001; r = .32, p <.05, respectively) for the recent period.  
By contrast, remote memories were less sensitive to age, as the overall spontaneity 
index was the only score that correlated with age (r = .39, p < .05). In the light of the 
descriptive data (Table 1), the absence of any correlation between age and the episodicity index 
for the remote period would appear to be due to the low level of performances regardless of the 
children’s age. Not only were remote memories less numerous than recent ones, but fewer than 
a third of these remote memories were episodic (29.96%). Most of them (70.04%) were non-
detailed and vague or repeated events, i.e. general experiences. Moreover, qualitative analyses 
of the data showed that whatever the children’s age at recall, remote EAMs never concerned 
the first two years. 
Finally, the sole phenomenological characteristic that varied with age was the quantity 
of visual imagery associated with recollections, which increased with age (r = .32, p < .05, r = 
.30, p = .05 for recent and remote periods, respectively). Furthermore, the episodicity index was 
positively linked with two phenomenological characteristics. Whatever the encoding period, the 
episodicity index correlated with emotion, suggesting that remote memories that persist are 
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more emotional (r = .38, r = .36, p <.05 for recent and remote memories, respectively). Only for 
recent memories was this index associated with quantity of imagery (r = .51, p < .01). No 
correlation concerned the frequency of rehearsal.  
 
EAM development: direct age effect or indirect age effect through the development of 
other cognitive abilities? 
 Table 3 presents the correlations between chronological age, EAM indices and the 3 
cognitive measures (episodic memory, executive functions and personal semantic memory). 
The correlation matrix showed moderate to high correlations between age and all the 
cognitive measures, with rs ranging from .41 to .70 (p < .05 to p < .01). Moreover, the 
cognitive measures were significantly linked to all the AM indices for the recent period, 
whereas semantic memory was the only cognitive ability to correlate with an AM index for 
the remote period (overall spontaneity). 
As age significantly correlated with all the cognitive measures, which in turn 
correlated with EAM indices (Table 3), the age-related effect on some AMs described earlier 
(Table 2) may have been due to age-related differences in some cognitive abilities. We 
therefore conducted two successive sets of regression analyses to test the possibility that the 
apparently direct correlations between age and AM might actually reflect indirect influence 
through other cognitive abilities. Initially, a forward step-wise regression analysis was 
conducted, with the EAM indices that increased with age as a dependent variable and the 
three cognitive abilities as independent variables. Thus, the best cognitive predictors were 
determined for the episodicity and specific spontaneity indices for the recent period and for 
overall spontaneity for the remote period. Further regressions were then conducted, forcing 
the predictors into the equation first, followed by age. The reasoning was that if chronological 
age was no longer a significant predictor of EAM indices after controlling for cognitive 
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abilities, then age-related differences in AM must be due to differences in these abilities, 
which are known to improve with age (for a comparable statistical method, see Pak, Czaja, 
Sharit, Rogers, & Fisk, 2006; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). 
First, results showed different predictors according to the index and the period under 
consideration (Table 4). Regarding the recent period, all three cognitive abilities contributed 
significantly to AM. The executive function score was the main predictor of the specific 
spontaneity index, accounting for 16% of the variance. Furthermore, performance on episodic 
memory and, to a lesser extent, on personal semantic memory, accounted for 23% and 17% of 
the total variance of the episodicity index. Concerning the remote period, the semantic 
memory score was the main predictor of the overall spontaneity index, accounting for 16% of 
the variance. 
Secondly, when variance related to other cognitive abilities was removed (significant 
predictors were forced into the regression equation first), age did not predict a significant 
amount of unique variance in AM performance beyond that accounted for by cognitive 
abilities (Table 4, 2
nd
 regression analysis). The proportion of variance shared between age and 
the AM indices was small (1 to 8%) and never reached significance, whereas it shared a 
significant proportion when cognitive abilities were not controlled for (Table 2; r² = 10.2 % to 
r² = 30.2 %, p < .05 to p < .001). Figure 1 depicts the underlying mechanisms that contributed 
to the age-related effect on AM for both periods.  
Taken together, these results indicate that between 6 and 11 years, AMs were 
characterized by a large age-related increase for the recent period (in the specific spontaneity 
and episodicity indices), whereas remote memories varied only slightly with age (overall 
spontaneity index). Nevertheless, these age-related increases in AM mainly reflected an 
indirect, age-related effect, reflecting the involvement of cognitive abilities known to undergo 
an age-related improvement. 
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DISCUSSION 
The major focus of this study was to identify the cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
development of EAMs in school-age children. We begin by discussing the results of age-
related changes in AM according to the encoding periods. We then tackle the issue of the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying these age related increases in AM. 
Age-related changes in AM: episodicity and spontaneity 
The correlational analysis (see Table 2) revealed an increase with age in the 
episodicity index based on autonoetic consciousness for the recent period. As such, it 
confirmed our previous AM study with school-age children (Piolino, Hisland et al., 2007) and 
earlier evidence using more conventional laboratory assessments of episodic memory 
(Billingsley, Smith, & McAndrews, 2002; Ofen, Kao, Sokol-Hessner, Kim, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, & Gabrieli, 2007). We therefore demonstrated that the sense of remembering 
continues to develop beyond 5 years, which is postulated to be the age at which episodic 
memory with autonoetic consciousness emerges (Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Wheeler, 1999). 
This finding reflects a growing ability to describe personal events from the perspective of the 
self (see Fivush, 2001), with abundant contextual details (i.e. recalling not only what 
happened but also where, when and how, with some phenomenological attributes); it suggests 
an improvement in the ability to truly relive a specific event, together with its external and 
internal encoding characteristics.  
As regards the remote period however, the episodicity index was low (compared with 
the recent period) and characterized by an age-related invariance (fewer than a third of the 
narratives described unique episodic memories accessed via autonoetic consciousness). In 
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other words, whatever the children’s age, the majority of the remote memories concerned 
general experiences. There was one age-related effect for this period, however, as the overall 
spontaneity index for the first 5 years increased with age, unlike the specific spontaneity 
index. As age increased, so, too, did the number of early memories prompted by cues, though 
not their episodicity. With increasing age, cues did, however, bring about a rise in the number 
of episodic memories from the recent period.   
These results confirm the special status of memories from the preschool years, 
covering the period of childhood amnesia, compared with remote memories from the early 
school years which show a large impact of age (see Piolino, Hisland et al., 2007). Our results 
reinforce the idea that childhood amnesia depends more on the age at encoding than on the 
length of the time interval or age at retrieval (see Newcombe et al., 2007; Peterson, 2002; 
Rubin, 2000; Van Abbema & Bauer, 2005; Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986, for reviews). More 
specifically, EAMs never concerned the first two years and only rarely concerned the period 
between 2 and 5 years of age, although they became more frequent thereafter. Thus, our 
results reinforce the distinction between these three different periods in the development of 
AM: infantile amnesia, childhood amnesia, and the period beyond 5 years of age (Newcombe 
et al., 2007). Even if events encoded during the first 5 years did not vary with age in terms of 
episodicity, we cannot rule out an effect of age on AM during this period. Many 
developmental studies have observed increasing abilities to encode and retain specific 
experiences over time (see Bauer et al., 2002, for an example). However, these studies used 
different methodologies, various scoring criteria and, more importantly, were based on 
different definitions of episodic memory (see Davis, Gross, & Hayne, 2008). Focusing on a 
strict episodic criterion based on autonoetic consciousness, our results confirmed the extreme 
scarcity of EAMs for the childhood amnesia period. Among the different explanations that 
have been put forward to explain the lack of very early EAMs (e.g. memories encoded in a 
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nonverbal form, not stored in a long-term system, present but inaccessible, etc; see de Haan et 
al., 2006, for a review), our results favor Tulving’s theory (Tulving, 1985, 2002; Wheeler et 
al., 1997) that the end of childhood amnesia corresponds to the emergence of episodic 
memory and self–awareness at 4 to 5 years old. First memories are, in fact, mainly semantic, 
whereas “true” episodic memories only emerge at the end of the preschool period (Farrar & 
Goodman, 1992; Hudson, 1990; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Pillemer, 1998; Pillemer et al., 
1994; Uehara, 2000). Accordingly, older children and adults are unable to subjectively re-
experience the circumstances of early personal events, not because of a problem of retrieval, 
but because of the virtual absence of truly episodic memory before that age (see also Neisser, 
2004). That said, the encoding of genuine EAMs appears to be influenced by self-relevance 
for children, as we observed differences arising from the topic proposed by the experimenter. 
Kindergarten events appeared to be more self-relevant cues, contrasting with scant memories 
of family events (see also Peterson et al., 2005).  
In sum, our results indicate that children aged from 6.6 to 11.3 years “just know” 
about general experiences from their 5 earliest years of life and hardly remember them at all 
(Wheeler, 1999). In accordance with Tulving’s theory (1985, 2002), this phenomenon does 
not vary according to age at retrieval nor, therefore, to the length of the retention interval. 
Generic memories, on the other hand, become more accessible to recall as children grow 
older. 
 
Age-related changes in EAM: rehearsal, emotion and mental images 
As regards the characteristics of EAM, results suggest that phenomenological features, 
such as frequency of rehearsal, emotional intensity and visual mental imagery, contribute to 
retrieval. As in the study by Peterson et al. (2005), our findings failed to reveal any significant 
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age-related changes in these properties, except for the amount of imagery associated with 
recent memories (Table 2). 
Interestingly, the episodicity index was correlated with emotion for both periods. In 
accordance with several developmental studies, we therefore observed that the recall of EAMs 
was not only determined by age at encoding or retrieval, but also by emotional intensity 
(Fivush et al., 2004; Ornstein, 1995; Peterson & Bell, 1996). Heightened emotional feelings 
are described in the literature as a critical factor not only for the age of the earliest memories 
(Eacott & Crawley, 1998; Fivush & Hamond, 1990; Ornstein, 1995; Sheingold & Tenney, 
1982; Usher & Neisser, 1993) but also, as shown in the present study, for the recollection of 
autonoetic memories, however remote.  
Like previous developmental studies (Pillemer & White, 1989), we also highlighted 
the key role of visual mental imagery in the autonoetic experience and spontaneity of EAMs. 
The visual re-experiencing of an event is almost invariably involved in the subjective sense of 
remembering (Conway, 2001; Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Piolino et al., 2009); its age-related 
increase seems to be a crucial factor in the development of autonoetic experience. Moreover, 
visual mental imagery was also positively linked to the spontaneity of recent memories, 
confirming its role in providing rich cues that are crucial to the generative processes involved in 
EAM retrieval (Conway, 2005; Greenberg & Rubin, 1998; Piolino, Desgranges, Clarys, 
Guillery-Girard, Taconnat, Isingrini et al., 2006).   
By contrast, the frequency of memory rehearsal did not appear to be a critical factor, as 
it neither varied with age, nor explained the quality of the memories or the ease with which 
children accessed AM. However, although memories did not seem to benefit from rehearsal 
(thinking or talking to others) in the present study, we cannot completely exclude the 
possibility that repetition may favor EAM retrieval, as it offers the child the opportunity to 
update the memory traces (see Fivush & Nelson, 2004).  
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In sum, the phenomenological characteristics of the memories modulate the quality and 
the ease with which subjects access AM during both childhood and adulthood (Piolino, Giffard-
Quillon, Desgranges, Chételat, Baron, Eustache, 2004; Quas et al., 1999; Viard, Piolino, 
Desgranges, Chételat, Lebreton, Landeau, et al., 2007). 
 
Cognitive mechanisms of age-related changes in EAM: direct or indirect effect of age?  
Whereas the phenomenological characteristics of memories varied only slightly with 
age, all three cognitive abilities assessed here (executive functions, episodic memory and 
personal semantic memory) improved dramatically with age (Table 4). All three cognitive 
performances were also linked to the EAM indices for the recent period, while just personal 
semantic memory was linked to the overall spontaneity index for the remote period. 
Developmental changes in EAM could therefore be partly influenced by the age-related 
increase in these cognitive abilities, pointing to a possible indirect effect of age. 
Based on several memory frameworks and the results of previous studies (Piolino et 
al., 2007), we assumed that the higher-order cognitive abilities, i.e. frontal/executive functions 
known to develop late in childhood (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; 
Klimkeit, Mattingley, Sheppard, Farrow, & Bradshaw, 2004; Letho et al., 2003), would 
constrain the development of EAM. Regression analyses confirmed that executive functions 
were the main predictor of the age-related increase in spontaneity for EAM for the recent 
period (Table 5). The age-related increase in the executive functions required during 
generative processes would appear to be responsible for the gradual improvement in the 
ability to access EAM. 
 - 25 - 
Similarly, developmental improvements in episodic and personal semantic memory in 
school-age children appeared to be crucial cognitive mechanisms for age-related changes in 
EAM, in keeping with Nelson and Fivush’s (2004) assumption (Table 5). On the one hand, 
episodic memory abilities (i.e. episodic learning) contributed partially to age-related changes 
in recent EAM. The absence of any very strong relationship between EAM and episodic 
learning was only to be expected, as they differ in many aspects (remoteness, self-relevance, 
assessment, etc.; see Wheeler et al., 2007). On the other hand, personal semantic memory 
mediated some of the changes in EAM regardless of the period. These results therefore 
support Conway’s assumption that the autobiographical knowledge base improves extensively 
across the lifespan (Conway, 2005). Although the role of semantic memory (and more 
especially of its growth during childhood) in episodic memory development has been studied 
in the past, semantic memory has always been assessed through general knowledge, and 
episodic memory through laboratory-based episodic learning (e.g. McGuigan & Salmon, 
2004; Murphy, McKone, Slee, 2003; Ornstein, Shapiro, Clubb, Follmer, & Baker-Ward, 
1997). For the first time, and in line with Conway’s self-memory system (2005), our results 
confirm the prominent role of personal semantic knowledge in EAM development. The more 
personal semantic knowledge was enriched with age, the easier AM retrieval became, 
especially for the first five years of life.  
In sum, our findings confirm that the increase in EAM with age is facilitated by richer 
semantic and episodic abilities and executive functions that allow AM to be accessed more 
easily. It thus reinforces the assumption that the development of EAMs relies mainly on the 
development of more basic systems (Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Tulving, 2002, 2005). 
Moreover, no significant effect of age was observed above and beyond its effect on cognitive 
abilities, suggesting that the age-related increase in AM in children above 6 years, and 
therefore beyond childhood amnesia, was fully explained by our cognitive measures. Thus, 
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the effect of age on AM was indirect rather than direct (see Figure 1) as it depended on the 
improvement during childhood of other cognitive processes required for the retrieval of AMs. 
Nevertheless, the predictive measures assessed here did not account for all EAM variability 
and it is reasonable to assume that the developmental differences may also have been due to 
other factors. Even if the recent model proposed by Nelson and Fivush (2004) was designed 
to describe all the main factors involved in the emergence of AM, many of them may 
contribute to its later development, too. Multiple factors may indeed have a role (Harley & 
Reese, 1999; Nelson & Fivush, 2004), notably temporal-reconstructive abilities (Friedman & 
Lyon, 2005), working memory (Baddeley, 2000), language (Pillemer & White 1989) and 
narrative skill (Fivush, Haden, & Adam, 1995). Future studies are thus required, in order to 
measure the importance of the cognitive abilities assessed here, in comparison with other 
factors that must also contribute to the effect of age on AM. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, our findings support the claim that developmental differences in 
remembering EAMs persist into early adolescence. More specifically, with age, children 
became increasingly capable of recalling recent autobiographical memories with details, 
displaying autonoetic consciousness. By contrast, the quality of memories retrieved from the 
first five years did not change with age - they were mainly general memories - although older 
children could access this period more easily. Moreover, our study substantiates the view that 
AM in 6- to 11-year-olds is formed in a gradual way, in concert with other aspects of 
cognitive development. The development of AM seems to be essentially bound up with the 
age-related improvement in the efficiency of other cognitive abilities (executive functions, 
episodic and personal semantic memory). Further studies are now needed if we are to unravel 
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the complete set of mechanisms subtending EAM in childhood and adolescence, and 
understand how this complex form of memory emerges in the first place. 
 
Acknowledgments 
The authors thank Elisabeth Porthier-Wilkes for reviewing for English language 
accuracy and all the children and their family who agreed to participate to this study. 
 
 - 28 - 
References  
Aubrun, F. (1998). How to assess postoperative pain? Annales Françaises d’Anesthésies et de 
Réanimation, 17, 462-470. 
Baddeley, A. D. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417-423. 
Barsalou, L. W. 1988. The content and organization of autobiographical memory. In U. 
Neisser, & E. Winograd (Eds.), Remembering reconsidered: Ecological and traditional 
approaches to the study of memory, pp. 193-243. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Bauer, P. J. (1996). What do infants recall of their lives? Memory for specific events by 1 to 2 
year olds. American Psychologist, 51, 29-41.  
Bauer, P. J., Burch, M. M., Scholin, S. E., & Güler, O. E. (2007). Using cue-words to 
investigate the distribution of autobiographical memories in childhood. Psychological 
Science, 18, 910-916.  
Billingsley, R. L., Smith, M. L., & McAndrews, M. P. (2002). Developmental patterns in 
priming and familiarity in explicit recollection. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
82, 251-277. 
Bird, A., & Reese, E. (2006). Emotional reminiscing and the development of an 
autobiographical self. Developmental Psychology, 42, 613-626. 
Casey, B. J., Galvan, A., & Hare, T. A. (2005). Changes in cerebral functional organization 
during cognitive development. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 15, 239-244. 
 - 29 - 
Cermak, L. S. (1984). The episodic-semantic distinction in amnesia. In L. R. Squire & N. 
Butters (Eds.), Neuropsychology of memory, pp. 55–62. New York: Guilford Press. 
Cheatham, C. L., & Bauer, P. J. (2005). Construction of a more coherent story: Prior verbal 
recall predicts later verbal accessibility of early memories. Memory, 13, 516-532. 
Cohen, M. J. (2001). Echelle clinique de mémoire pour enfants. Paris: Editions du Centre de 
Psychologie Appliquée. 
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and Language, 53, 594-628. 
Conway, M. A., Gardiner, J. M., Perfect, T. J., Anderson, S. J., & Cohen, G. M. (1997). 
Changes in memory awareness during learning: The acquisition of knowledge by psychology 
undergraduates. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 393–413. 
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261-288. 
Davidson, M. C., Amso, D., Anderson, L. C., & Diamond, A. (2006). Development of 
cognitive control and executive functions from 4 to 13 years: Evidence from manipulations of 
memory, inhibition, and task switching. Neuropsychologia, 44, 2037-2078. 
De Haan, M., Mishkin, M., Baldeweg, T., & Vargha-Khadem, F. (2006). Human memory 
development and its dysfunction after early hippocampal injury. Trends in Neurosciences, 29, 
374-381. 
Dewhurst, S. A., & Conway, M. A. (1994). Pictures, images, and recollective experience. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20, 1088–1098. 
 - 30 - 
Eacott, M. J., & Crawley, R. A. (1998). The offset of childhood amnesia: Memory for events 
that occurred before age 3. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 22-33. 
Farrar, M. J., & Goodman, G. S. (1992). Developmental changes in event memory. Child 
Development, 63, 173-187. 
Fivush, R. (2001). Owning experience: Developing subjective perspective in autobiographical 
narratives. In C. Moore & K. Lemmon (Eds.), The self in time: Developmental perspectives, 
(pp. 35–52). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Fivush, R., Haden, C., & Adam, S. (1995). Structure and coherence of preschoolers’ personal 
narratives over time: Implications for childhood amnesia. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 60, 32–56. 
Fivush, R., & Hamond, N. R. (1990). Autobiographical memory across the preschool years: 
Toward reconceptualizing childhood amnesia. In R. Fivush & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing 
and remembering in young children, pp. 223-248. Cambridge, NY: University Press. 
Fivush, R., Sales, J. M., Goldberg, A., Bahrick, L., & Parker, J. (2004). Weathering the storm: 
Children's long-term recall of Hurricane Andrew. Memory, 12, 104-118 
Friedman, W. J., & Lyon, D. (2005). Development of temporal-reconstructive abilities. Child 
Development, 76, 1202-1216. 
Gardiner, J. M. (1988). Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory and Cognition, 
16, 309-313. 
 - 31 - 
Gardiner, J. M. (2001). Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: A first-person 
approach. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 356, 1351-1362. 
Gathercole, S. E. (1998). The development of memory. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 39, 3-27.  
Giedd, J. N., Blumenthal, J., Jeffries, N. O., Castellanos, F. X., Liu, H., Zijdenbos, A., et al., 
(1999). Brain development during childhood and adolescence: A longitudinal MRI study. 
Nature Neuroscience, 2, 861-863. 
Greenberg, D. L., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). The neuropsychology of autobiographical memory. 
Cortex, 39, 687–728. 
Howe, M. L., Cicchetti, D., Toth, S. L., & Cerrito, B. M. (2004). True ands false memory in 
maltreated children. Child Development, 75, 1402-1417. 
Hudson, J. (1990). Constructive processing in children's event memory. Developmental 
Psychology, 26, 180-187. 
Kaufman, A. S., & Kaufman, N. L. (1993). Batterie pour l’examen psychologique de l’enfant 
(K-ABC). Paris: Editions du Centre de Psychologie Appliquée. 
Klimkeit, E. I., Mattingley, J. B., Sheppard, D. M., Farrow, M., & Bradshaw J. L. (2004). 
Examining the development of attention and executive functions in children with a novel 
paradigm. Child Neuropsychology, 10, 201-211. 
 - 32 - 
Lehto, J. E., Juujärvi, P., Kooistra, L., & Pulkkinen, L. (2003). Dimensions of executive 
functioning: Evidence from children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 21, 59-
80. 
Mäntylä, T. (1993). Knowing but not remembering: Adult age differences in recollective 
experience. Memory and Aging, 21, 379-88. 
Mäntylä, T., Carelli, M. G., & Forman, H. (2007). Time monitoring and executive functioning 
in children and adults. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 96, 1-19. 
McGuigan, F., & Salmon, K. (2004). The time to talk: The influence of the timing of adult-
child talk on children's event memory. Child Development, 75, 669-686. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). What infant memory tells us about infantile amnesia: Long-term 
recall and deferred imitation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 59, 497-515.  
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
"frontal lobe" tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49-100. 
Morris, G., & Baker-Ward, L. (2007). Fragile but real: Children's capacity to use newly 
acquired words to convey preverbal memories. Child Development, 78, 448-458.  
Morris, N., & Jones, D. M. (1990). Memory updating in working memory: The role of the 
central executive. British Journal of Psychology, 81, 111–121. 
Murphy, K., McKone, E., & Slee, J. (2003). Dissociations between implicit and explicit 
memory in children: The role of strategic processing and the knowledge base. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 84, 124-165. 
 - 33 - 
Nelson, K. (1986). Event knowledge: Structure and function in development. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum.  
Nelson, K. (1988). The ontogeny of memory for real events. In U. Neisser & E. Winograd 
(Eds.), Remembering reconsidered: Ecological and traditional approaches to the study of 
memory, pp. 2244-2276. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Nelson, K., & Fivush, R. (2004). The emergence of autobiographical memory: A 
sociocultural developmental theory. Psychological Review, 111, 486-511.  
Newcombe, N. S., Lloyd, M. E., & Ratliff, K. R. (2007). Development of episodic and 
autobiographical memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. Advances in Child 
Development and Behavior, 35, 37-85. 
Ofen, N., Kao, Y., Sokol-Hessner, P., Kim, H., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. 
(2007). Development of declarative memory system in the human brain. Nature 
Neuroscience, 10, 1198-1205. 
Ornstein, P. A. (1995). Children's long-term retention of salient personal experiences. Journal 
of Traumatic Stress, 8, 581-605. 
Ornstein, P. A., Baker-Ward, L., Gordon, B. N., Pelphrey, K. A., Tyler, C. S., & Gramzow, E. 
(2006). The influence of prior knowledge and repeated questioning on children's long-term 
retention of the details of a paediatric examination. Developmental Psychology, 42, 332-344. 
Ornstein, P. A., Shapiro, L. R., Clubb, P. A., Follmer, A., & Baker-Ward, L. (1997). The 
influence of prior knowledge on children’s memory for salient medical experiences. In N. 
Stein, P. A. Ornstein, C. J. Brainerd, & B. Tversky (Eds.), Memory for everyday and 
emotional events, pp. 83–111. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 - 34 - 
 
Pak, R., Czaja, S. J., Sharit, J., Rogers, W. A., & Fisk, A. D. (2006). The role of spatial 
abilities and age in performance in an auditory computer navigation task. Computers in 
Human Behavior, 24, 3045-3051. 
Perner, J., & Ruffman, T. (1995). Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: 
Developmental evidence and the theory of childhood amnesia. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 59, 516-548. 
Peterson, C. (2002). Children's long-term memory for autobiographical events. 
Developmental Review, 22, 370-402. 
Peterson, C., & Bell, M. (1996). Children's memory for traumatic injury. Child Development, 
67, 3045-3070. 
Peterson, C., Grant, V. V., & Boland, L. D. (2005). Childhood amnesia in children and 
adolescents: Their earliest memories. Memory, 13, 622-637. 
Pillemer, D. B. (1998). What is remembered about early childhood events. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 18, 895-913. 
Pillemer, D. B., Picariello, M. L., & Pruett, J. C. (1994). Very long-term memories of a salient 
preschool event. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 8, 95–106. 
Pillemer, D. B., & White, S. H. (1989). Childhood events recalled by children and adults. In 
H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in childhood development and behaviour, pp. 297-340. San 
Diego: Academic Press. 
 - 35 - 
Piolino, P., & Eustache, F. (2001). Conceptions neuropsychologiques de l’amnésie infantile. 
In F. Eustache & M. Wolf (Eds.), Monographies de Psychopathologie: Affections 
neurologiques et processus psychiques, pp. 73-114. Paris: PUF. 
Piolino, P., Giffard-Quillon, G., Desgranges, B., Chételat, G., Baron, J-C., & Eustache, F. 
(2004). Re-experiencing old memories via hippocampus: A PET study of autobiographical 
memory. NeuroImage, 22, 1371-1383. 
Piolino, P, Desgranges, B, Clarys, D, Guillery-Girard, B, Taconnat, L, Isingrini M, & 
Eustache, F. (2006). Autobiographical memory, autonoetic consciousness, and self-
perspective in aging. Psychology and Aging, 21, 510-525. 
Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., Manning, L., North, P., Jokic, F., & Eustache, F. (2007). 
Autobiographical memory, the sense of recollection and executive functions after severe 
closed head injury. Cortex, 43, 176-195.  
Piolino, P., Hisland, M., Ruffeveille, I., Matuszewski, V., Jambaque, I., & Eustache, F. 
(2007). Do school-age children remember or know the personal past? Consciousness and 
Cognition, 16, 84-101. 
Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., & Eustache, F. Episodic autobiographical memory over the 
course of time: Cognitive, neuropsychological and neuroimaging findings. Neuropsychologia, 
in press.  
Principe, G. F.,
 
Ornstein, P. A., Baker-Ward, L., & Gordon, B. N. (2000). The effects of 
intervening experiences on children's memory for a physical examination. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 14, 59-80.  
 - 36 - 
Reitan, R. M. (1958). Validity of the Trail Making Test as an indication of organic brain 
damage. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 8, 271–286.  
Rubin, D. C. (2000). The distribution of early childhood memories. Memory, 8, 265-269. 
Rubin, D. C., & Kozin, M. (1984). Vivid memories. Cognition, 16, 81-95. 
Salthouse, T. A. (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in cognition. 
Psychological Review, 103, 403-428.  
Sheingold, K., & Tenney, X. J. (1982). Memory for a salient childhood event. In U. Neisser 
(Ed.), Memory observed, pp. 201-212. San Francisco: Freeman.  
Souchay, C. & Isingrini, M. (2004). Age related differences in metacognitive control: Role of 
executive functioning. Brain and Cognition, 56, 89-99. 
Sowell, E. R., Thompson, P. ., Holmes, C. J., Jernigan, T. L., & Toga, A. W. (1999). In vivo 
evidence for post-adolescent brain maturation in frontal and striatal regions. Nature 
Neuroscience, 2, 859-961.  
Sowell, E. R., Thompson, P. M., Tessner, T. D., & Toga, A. W. (2001). Mapping continued 
brain growth and gray matter density reduction in dorsal frontal cortex: Inverse relationships 
during postadolescent brain maturation. The Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 8819–8829. 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 18, 643–662. 
Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 40, 385-
398. 
 - 37 - 
Tulving, E. (2001). Episodic memory and common sense: How far apart? Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society, 356, 1505-1515. 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 
1-25.  
Tulving, E., Schacter, D. L., McLachlan, D. R., & Moscovitch, M. (1988). Priming of 
semantic autobiographical knowledge: A case study of retrograde amnesia. Brain and 
Cognition, 8, 3–20. 
Uehera, I. (2000). Differences in episodic memory between four- and five-year-olds: False 
information versus real experiences. Psychological Reports, 86, 745-755. 
Usher, J. A., & Neisser, U. (1993). Childhood amnesia and the beginnings of memory for four 
early life events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 155-165.  
Van Abbema, D. L., & Bauer, P. J. (2005). Autobiographical memory in middle childhood: 
Recollections of the recent and distant past. Memory, 13, 829-845. 
Viard, A., Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., Chételat, G., Lebreton, K., Landeau, B. et al. (2007). 
Hippocampal activation for autobiographical memories over the entire lifetime in healthy 
aged subjects: An fMRI study. Cerebral Cortex, 17, 2453-2467. 
Wechsler, D. (1991). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third Edition. French 
version. Paris: Editions du Centre de Psychologie Appliquée. 
Wetzler, S. E., & Sweeney, J. A. (1986). Childhood amnesia: An empirical demonstration. In 
D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory, pp. 191-201. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 - 38 - 
Wheeler, M. A. (1999). Varieties of consciousness and memory in the developing child. In E. 
Tulving (Ed.), Memory, consciousness, and the brain: The Tallinn conference, (pp. 188-199. 
Philadelphia: Psychology Press. 
Wheeler, M. A., Stuss, D. T., & Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of episodic memory: 
The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 331-354. 
 - 39 - 
Table 1. Means scores on the TEMPAu test expressed in percentages (and standard 
deviations). Results of the t-tests that allowed recent and remote periods to be compared are 
shown in the right-hand columns.  
 Recent period Remote period  t ddl p 
Mean number of events 
recalled (maximum = 3)  
2.77 (0.43) 1.77 (0.86)  5.78 29 < 10
-5
 
Overall spontaneity 61.94 (16.03) 45.56 (28.25)  2.81 29 < .01 
Specific spontaneity 67.92 (16.85)  72.92 (24.96)  -.92 27 ns 
Episodicity  51.11 (22.48) 29.96 (22.65)  5.33 27 < 10
-4
 
  
Rehearsal  36.85 (25.41) 28.86 (25.14)  1.61 27 ns 
Emotion 71.38 (22.44) 64.70 (28.89)  1.43 27 ns 
Visual mental imagery  55.25 (26.81) 45.38 (28.32)  3.23 27 < .01 
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Table 2. Relations between age, the three indices of the TEMPAu test and the analogue scales 
for each encoding period (N = 30). 
 Recent period Remote period 
 Age Rehearsal Emotion Imagery Age Rehearsal Emotion Imagery 
Age - .18 .19 .32* - .23 .02 .30
& 
Overall spontaneity .28 - - - .39* - - - 
Specific spontaneity .32* .19 .18 .31
&
 .26 .12 .01 .05 
Episodicity .55*** .07 .38* .51** .05 .07 .36
*
 .17 
 
&
 p=.05, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Note: correlations between prompting and analogue measures were not calculated, as the 
analogue scores took into account the number of memories recalled, whereas the overall 
spontaneity index was based on the number of memory requests (3 per period). 
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Table 3. Relations between age, the three indices on the TEMPAu test and the general 
cognitive assessment. 
 
 
Executive 
functions  
Episodic 
memory 
Personal semantic 
memory 
Age .70*** .52
**
 .41* 
    
Overall spontaneity(recent period) .40* .29 .23 
Specific spontaneity (recent period) .40** .27 .07 
Episodicity (recent period) .42** .48** .47** 
    
Overall spontaneity (remote period) .25 .24 .39* 
Specific spontaneity (remote period) .00 .02 .16 
Episodicity (remote period) .05 .06 .22 
 
* p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 4. Final results of the regression analysis conducted with the age-sensitive indices of 
AM as dependent variables. Two regression analyses were conducted for each dependent 
variable.  
1
st
: the results correspond to the forward stepwise regression using the 3 cognitive measures 
(episodic memory, executive functions, and personal semantic memory) as independent 
variables.  
2
nd
: the results correspond to the regression analyses where the significant predictors of the 1
st
 
analysis were entered into the regression first, followed by age.  
 
Dependent variable  Predictor R
2 
Total R²  Bêta F 
Specific spontaneity  1
st
 Executive functions .16*  .40 5.45* 
(recent period) 2
nd
  Age .01   0.1, ns 
       
Episodicity 
(recent period) 
1
st
 Episodic memory  
Semantic memory 
.23** 
.17* 
 
.40*** 
.48 
.42 
8.39** 
7.84** 
 2
nd
  Age .05   1.9, ns 
       
Overall spontaneity 1
st
 Semantic memory .16*  .37 5.18* 
(remote period) 2
nd
  Age .08   2.27, ns 
 
The first R
2
 indicates the proportion of variance mediated by each predictor; total R² indicates 
the cumulative percentage of variance mediated by all significant predictors, when the 
predictors accounted for a significant proportion of variance; The F ratios show the 
significance of the R² for each predictor. 
* p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the mechanisms of age-related improvements in recent 
and remote autobiographical memories. The proportion of variance shared between age and 
the three cognitive functions are indicated above the full lines, and the proportion of variance 
shared between the cognitive functions and AM indices are indicated above the dotted lines.  
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Appendix A 
Instructions for the analogue scales 
 Frequency of rehearsal: “Use this line to indicate how often you think about the 
memories you have just recalled. This side of the line (i.e. left side) means that you have 
never thought or talked about this event since it happened to you. By contrast, the other side 
(i.e. right side) means that you never stop thinking about this event. The further you go on this 
side of the line (the experimenter points to the right side), the more often you think about this 
event. I would like you to draw a mark on the line to indicate how often you think about the 
memory you have just recalled.” 
Emotion at encoding: “Now, I would like to know about the emotion you felt during 
the initial event. The left side of the line means that you felt no emotion, whereas the other 
side means that you got very emotional, for example very happy or very sad. You must draw a 
mark on the line to indicate the intensity of emotion caused by the event you have just 
recalled.” 
Visual mental imagery: “Finally, I would like to know about the amount of visual 
mental imagery associated with your recall of this event. When we remember a previous 
experience, we often have the feeling that we are “reliving” the past, accompanied by mental 
imagery. The left side of the line means that no images are associated with this memory, 
whereas the other side means that you have lots of images; it is like a film in your mind. You 
must draw a mark on the line to indicate the amount of visual mental imagery you have when 
recalling this event.” 
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Appendix B. Examples of autobiographical memories evoked for each period.  
Recent period (last year) 
 “Last summer, I went to an aqua park called “Maryland” in Antibes. At 11 pm, the 
night show begun. It was a show with dolphins. A killer whale splashed people in the 
audience and they got soaked. I was very happy because it was the first time I had seen 
anything like it. I didn’t know that the killer whale was such a big animal. I hoped the show 
would last for a very long time. I had watched a lot of other shows during the day. It was 
really fun. After that, I went back to the hotel with my dad to sleep. Our room was on the 
second floor. It was in 2003, when I was 9 year old.” 
 Unique, specific and detailed memory recalled with spatiotemporal information 
(EAM) 
 
Remote period (preschool years) 
 “I was 4 or 5 years old. A woman was standing in for the person who usually 
supervised our nap. She said something and all the children, including me, fell asleep. The 
whole class was there, except for the younger children. We had the nap after lunch, and went 
back to the classroom after the nap.” 
 Unique, specific memory recalled without details and with no precise spatiotemporal 
information (AM) 
